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I.

INTRODUCTION

Federal antidiscrimination statutes generally ban adverse employment
actions taken “because of” certain specified traits or characteristics. Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, for example, an employer is prohibited from
discriminating “because of” an individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.” 1 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)

* Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty, & Bennett Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law
School.
 J.D. 2008, University of Minnesota Law School; Associate, Best & Flanagan LLP,
Minneapolis, Minnesota.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2000).
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uses similar language in banning discrimination “against any individual . . .
because of such individual’s age.” 2 And, while the antidiscrimination formula
utilized by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) is more
complicated than either Title VII or the ADEA, it too prohibits discrimination
“against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 3
As the Supreme Court has stated, “The ultimate question in every
employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is
whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination.” 4 The
antidiscrimination prohibition contained in each of these three statutes,
however, extends only to actions undertaken by an “employer” and “any
agents” of an employer. 5 Thus, liability hinges upon the showing of a causal
connection between some discriminatory action attributable to a statutory
employer and some adverse employment action suffered by an employee. 6
This connection is most easily established when a sole proprietor
discriminates by discharging or otherwise taking some adverse action with
respect to a rank-and-file employee. More typically, in a corporate
organizational structure, a plaintiff may establish a statutory violation by
showing that a supervisor has used his or her delegated authority to alter an
employee’s terms and conditions of employment because of the employee’s
protected class status. 7 In both contexts, the necessary causal nexus is present
because the employer or the agent harboring the discriminatory intent also is the
party who effectuates the resulting adverse employment action.

2. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
3. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (to be codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). The ADA’s antidiscrimination formula is more complicated in
two significant respects. First, only individuals who have a qualifying “disability” have standing to
assert a claim under the ADA. See id. Second, in ascertaining whether an employer is
discriminating under the ADA, the statute asks whether the employee is qualified for the job “with
or without reasonable accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000); see also Stephen F. Befort
& Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial Dissonance, the Supreme Court’s
Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimination Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 69–70 (1999).
4. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (ADEA definition of “employer”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Title VII
definition of “employer”); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (ADA’s definition of “employer”). Title VII
and the ADA define covered employers as entities employing fifteen or more employees. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Title VII definition of covered employers); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (ADA
definition of covered employers). The ADEA covers employers with twenty or more employees.
29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (ADEA definition of covered employers).
6. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272–73 (2001) (per curiam).
7. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998) (“[A] tangible
employment action taken by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the
employer.”); see also Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?:
Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 520–22 (2001)
(explaining the Supreme Court’s decision in Ellerth).
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But what if these two attributes, although both present in the workplace, do
not coalesce in the same individual? That is the conundrum presented in
subordinate bias litigation. The typical scenario presenting the issue of
subordinate bias liability consists of a frontline supervisor or other employee
who harbors a discriminatory animus toward a protected group or trait. The
supervisor does not possess authority to implement adverse employment actions
against the target employee, but instead influences those with decision making
authority by making unfavorable recommendations or by falsifying records.
Someone on a higher rung of the human resources ladder, who does have
authority to make concrete decisions about terms and conditions of
employment, then relies on the information. In this setting, although the adverse
employment action is not made directly by someone acting with a conscious
intent to discriminate, the bias of the lower level supervisor taints the decision
making process. 8
Judge Posner, in Shager v. Upjohn Co., 9 coined the term “cat’s paw”
liability to refer to employer liability resulting from subordinate bias. The term
derives from the fable of the monkey and the cat by Jean de La Fontaine. 10 The
fable tells the tale of a conniving monkey that wants to eat chestnuts roasting in
a fire. 11 The monkey is unwilling to burn himself to get the chestnuts, and
instead convinces a cat to do his bidding. 12 As the cat repeatedly burns its paws
retrieving the chestnuts from the fire, the monkey sits back unharmed,
devouring the chestnuts. 13 The modern connotation of “cat’s-paw” refers to
“one used by another to accomplish his purposes.” 14 In the employment context,
the monkey represents the biased subordinate, while the cat represents the
employer who acts as the conduit to commit discriminatory adverse actions
against the victimized employee. 15
Since 1990, every federal circuit court of appeals, 16 as well as the Supreme
Court, 17 have endorsed the notion that subordinate bias may be a basis for
imputing liability to an employer in appropriate circumstances. The problem is

8. See infra text accompanying notes 23–38.
9. 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
10. See THE FABLES OF LA FONTAINE (Elizur Wright trans., 1882).
11. See EEOC v. BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir.
2006) (describing the La Fontaine’s fable), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007).
12. Id.
13. Id. (citing THE FABLES OF LA FONTAINE, supra note 10, at 344).
14. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 354 (2002).
15. BCI, 450 F.3d at 484.
16. See Ali Razzaghi, Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc.: “Substantially
Influencing” the Fourth Circuit to Change Its Standard for Imputing Employer Liability for the
Biases of a Non-Decisionmaker, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1709, 1715–23 (2005) (explaining the
different holdings of the circuit courts of appeals with respect to subordinate bias liability).
17. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 152–54 (2000).
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that no agreement exists as to just what set of circumstances are appropriate for
such an outcome. The majority of circuit courts have adopted a relatively
lenient standard which imposes liability whenever a biased subordinate
influences an adverse action made by an ultimate decisionmaker. 18
More recently, three circuits have raised the bar for finding subordinate bias
liability. The strictest standard, adopted by the Fourth Circuit, limits liability to
the situation in which the biased subordinate is the de facto actual or principal
decisionmaker. 19 Two other circuits have adopted intermediate approaches that
focus more closely on causation and on whether the employer has undertaken an
independent investigation into the underlying circumstances. 20 In taking review
of one of the decisions espousing an intermediate approach, it appeared for a
while that the Supreme Court might provide some answers as to the scope of
subordinate bias liability. 21 But, those hopes were dashed in 2007 when the
parties settled the underlying action, and the Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal. 22
This Article attempts to fill this gap by suggesting the appropriate contours
for determining the reach of subordinate bias liability. Part II reviews the
origins of the cat’s paw theory in the Shager decision and in the Supreme
Court’s subsequent Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. decision. Part
III lays out the competing standards established by the circuit courts of appeals.
Part IV then analyzes three crucial issues that inform the policy bases for
subordinate bias liability: (1) What is the appropriate causation standard
regarding the impact of the biased subordinate’s conduct?; (2) When is the
subordinate’s discriminatory bias properly attributable to the employer in terms
of agency principles?; and (3) What should be the impact of an employer’s
investigation into the underlying circumstances? Finally, in Part V, rather than
endorsing any of the existing standards recognized by the courts of appeals, the
Article proposes a new test that draws on the various strengths of the current
formulations. Under this test, a plaintiff should be recognized as making out a
prima facie case of subordinate bias liability by showing that a supervisor, or
other employee with delegated authority, influenced an adverse employment
action to the extent that discrimination was a motivating factor in that outcome.
Once an employee makes such a showing, an employer should be liable unless
it can establish the existence of either of two affirmative defenses. First,

18. See infra Part III.A.
19. See infra Part III.B.
20. See infra Part III.C.
21. See BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angles v. EEOC, 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007)
(granting certiorari to the United States Supreme Court).
22. See BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles v. EEOC, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007)
(dismissing certiorari to the United States Supreme Court).
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borrowing from sexual harassment jurisprudence, an employer should not be
liable where it has taken reasonable measures to prevent and correct such bias—
for instance, by implementing an anti-bias policy—and the plaintiff
unreasonably has failed to use the opportunities provided. Second, where the
plaintiff has utilized such a policy or where no policy exists, an employer
should be able to avoid liability only if it has dissipated the taint of subordinate
bias by undertaking a fair and independent investigation into the circumstances
underlying the contemplated employment action. This new test would
encourage employers to protect themselves by preventing discrimination in the
workplace while still providing plaintiffs with a reasonable opportunity to
obtain redress for such discrimination that nonetheless may occur.
THE ORIGINS OF SUBORDINATE BIAS LIABILITY

II.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in 1990, first addressed the issue of
cat’s paw liability in Shager v. Upjohn Co. 23 Shager worked as a sales
representative for a seed company. 24 At the time of his termination, Shager was
fifty-three years of age and reported to Lehnst, a thirty-eight-year-old district
manager. 25 Lehnst manipulated Shager’s sales territory and then placed him on
probation for alleged performance deficiencies. 26 Eventually, Lehnst
recommended to the employer’s “‘Career Path Committee,’ which reviews
personnel actions,” that Shager be fired, and the committee concurred. 27 Shager
sued under the ADEA claiming age discrimination, but the district court granted
the employer’s motion for summary judgment. 28
Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, provided a primer on
employment discrimination basics. 29 After reviewing basic agency principles,
Judge Posner opined that if supervisor Lehnst had directly fired Shager due to
age-related animus, the employer would be liable regardless of whether anyone
else connected with the company shared that particular viewpoint. 30 But, Judge
Posner added:
Lehnst did not fire Shager; the Career Path Committee did. If it did so
for reasons untainted by any prejudice of Lehnst’s against older
workers, the causal link between that prejudice and Shager’s discharge

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 399.
See id. at 399–400.
Id.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 399.
See id. at 400–02.
Id. at 404–05.
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is severed, and Shager cannot maintain this suit even if [the employer]
is fully liable for Lehnst’s wrongdoing. But if Shager’s evidence is
believed, as in the present posture of the case it must be, the
committee’s decision to fire him was tainted by Lehnst’s prejudice. . . .
If it acted as the conduit of Lehnst’s prejudice—his cat’s-paw—the
innocence of its members would not spare the company from liability. 31
Finding this to be an unanswered question of fact, the Seventh Circuit reversed
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded. 32
The Supreme Court, eight years later, endorsed the general concept of
subordinate bias liability in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. 33 In
Reeves, there was no direct or circumstantial evidence that the official
decisionmaker held any discriminatory animus. 34 Instead, the plaintiff presented
evidence that a supervisor, who was also the official decisionmaker’s husband,
harbored discriminatory animus toward the plaintiff because of the latter’s
age. 35 The Supreme Court held that the absence of a discriminatory intent on
the part of the official decisionmaker did not mandate judgment as a matter of
law for the defendant because the plaintiff had provided evidence that one of the
plaintiff’s superiors “was motivated by age-based animus and was principally
responsible for petitioner’s firing.” 36 Under the circumstances, the Court found
that the supervisor was the “actual decisionmaker” behind the firing, 37 and that
his actions were sufficient to support a jury verdict finding the employer liable
for age discrimination. 38
While the Supreme Court in Reeves recognized subordinate bias liability in
principle, the Court did not discuss the range of circumstances under which
such liability would ensue. 39 As a result, the task of determining the contours of
subordinate bias liability has been left to the circuit courts of appeals. As the
next section demonstrates, this has led to a plethora of competing standards.

31. Id.(citations omitted).
32. Id. at 406.
33. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
34. See id. at 146.
35. Id. at 151–52.
36. Id. at 152.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 153–54.
39. See, e.g., White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 497 (“But Reeves, we believe, is best read as
not confronting directly the difficult question of how to determine whether discriminatory intent is
present in cases where multiple actors are involved in the decision making process.”).
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CURRENT CIRCUIT COURT POSITIONS

The circuit courts of appeals have adopted a diversity of positions with
respect to subordinate bias liability, and it would be most accurate to see these
positions as falling along a widely arching continuum. For purposes of
discussion and analysis, however, we describe these viewpoints using three
basic categories: lenient, intermediate, and strict. Despite the considerable
variations in the tests articulated in individual decisions, the cases within each
of these three groupings share a similarity in underlying theory and operative
criteria. In addition, the order in which these three categories are presented
reflect the order of chronological development.
A. The Lenient Standard
The majority of circuits employ a lenient standard in determining the
existence of subordinate bias liability. This approach, adopted in the vast
majority of decisions issued prior to 2005, sets a relatively low threshold that a
plaintiff must satisfy in order to avoid summary judgment, and, ultimately, in
order to establish grounds for employer liability. Under this standard,
“[S]ummary judgment generally is improper where the plaintiff can show that
an employee with discriminatory animus provided factual information or other
input that may have affected the adverse employment action.” 40 Courts that
follow this approach generally believe that discrimination on any level of the
decision making process has the ability to influence the ultimate decisionmaker
and thus constitutes a reasonable basis for imposing liability. 41
Most courts adhering to the lenient standard require that the biased
subordinate exercise some degree of “influence” over the ultimate employment
decision at issue. 42 A typical example is the First Circuit’s decision in
Santiago–Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp. 43 In that case, the plaintiff,
Santiago–Ramos, was a high-level female executive for Centennial who was
married with one child and working with all male counterparts. 44 Santiago–
Ramos’s supervisor, Rivera, made several comments to Santiago–Ramos, which
were direct evidence of sex-based discrimination. 45 In determining whether

40. Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir. 1994).
41. Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[I]t
plainly is permissible for a jury to conclude that an evaluation at any level, if based on
discrimination, influenced the decisionmaking process and thus allowed discrimination to infect
the ultimate decision.” (citing Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 727 (3d Cir. 1988))).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 46–54.
43. 217 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2000).
44. Id. at 50.
45. Id. at 50–51.
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liability could be imposed on Centennial through the bias of Rivera, the court
discussed Rivera’s “influence” on Mayberry, the formal decisionmaker:
Santiago–Ramos can establish that Centennial’s stated reasons for her
dismissal are a pretext for discrimination in a number of ways. One
method is to show that discriminatory comments were made by the key
decisionmaker or those in a position to influence the
decisionmaker. . . . There is evidence that Mayberry, head of Puerto
Rico operations for the parent company, was the key decisionmaker in
the termination of Santiago–Ramos’ employment. It is also clear that
Rivera, Santiago–Ramos’ direct supervisor and general manager in
Puerto Rico, was in a position to influence Mayberry in that decision. 46
Not surprisingly, the decisions have described the amount of influence
required in various terms, including:
[E]vidence of a subordinate’s bias is relevant where the ultimate
decision maker is not insulated from the subordinate’s influence. 47
[T]he plaintiff must offer evidence that the supervisor’s racial animus
was the cause of the termination or somehow influenced the ultimate
decisionmaker. 48
Consequently, it is appropriate to tag the employer with an employee’s
age-based animus if the evidence indicates that the worker possessed
leverage, or exerted influence, over the titular decisionmaker. 49
Young’s alleged statements to Rose . . . were comments made directly
to her on more than one occasion by her immediate supervisor, who
had enormous influence in the decision-making process. 50
Other decisions have focused more on the subordinate’s participation in the
decisionmaking process:

46.
47.
added).
48.
49.
added).
50.

Id. at 55 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Griffin v. Wash. Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (emphasis
Christian v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 877 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227 (5th Cir. 2000) (emphasis
Rose v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 257 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
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Even if a manager was not the ultimate decisionmaker, that manager’s
retaliatory motive may be imputed to the company if the manager was
involved in the hiring decision. 51
Instead, this case involves a nondecisionmaker who was closely
involved in the decisionmaking process . . . . 52
Based upon these facts, we conclude that a jury could reasonably find
that [the store manager] played a significant role in [the district
manager’s] decisionmaking process. 53
Our cases have noted that this situation may occur in an instance in
which a subordinate, by concealing relevant information from the
decisionmaker, is able to manipulate the decisionmaking process and to
influence the decision. 54
The Third Circuit has summarized the lenient standard approach most
accurately by stating that subordinate basis liability can be established when
“those exhibiting discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the
decision to terminate.” 55
The Eleventh Circuit has articulated a somewhat different approach in
stating that it will find subordinate bias liability when the titular decisionmaker
is a “mere conduit” for the subordinate’s discriminatory animus. 56 Although one
commentator has described the Eleventh Circuit as utilizing a variation of the
lenient standard, 57 the use of the term “conduit” seems to indicate a somewhat
higher hurdle. Rather than simply asking whether a subordinate’s bias
influenced an adverse decision, the conduit language suggests that the
subordinate’s impact must substantially displace the decisionmaker’s exercise
of discretion. Because the case law in the Eleventh Circuit is not well developed
on this issue, the best we can do is to speculate that this circuit’s position
remains uncertain.

51. Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136,
1141 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
52. EEOC v. Liberal R–II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
53. Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 868 (6th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
54. Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasis
added).
55. Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001)
(emphasis added); see also Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding
liability where a “biased subordinate influenced or was involved in the decision or decisionmaking
process”).
56. Llampallas v. Mini–Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1249 (11th Cir. 1998).
57. See Razzaghi, supra note 16, at 1721–22.
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Thus, throughout the circuits that use the lenient standard, there is some
variety as to the specific requirements needed to show that the subordinate
possessed the requisite amount of influence on the adverse employment
decision. However, what is clear—except perhaps in the Eleventh Circuit—is
that a plaintiff need not show that the individual making the ultimate decision
simply rubber-stamped the subordinate’s decision. 58 Instead, the influence or
taint of subordinate bias itself is sufficient to establish a causal link to employer
liability. Similarly, the courts using the lenient standard do not look to agency
principles in determining whether an employer should be liable for a decision
tainted by subordinate bias. Courts using the lenient standard simply presume
that if a subordinate’s influence is causally connected to an ultimate
employment decision, then such decision must necessarily be attributable to the
employer for purposes of liability.
B. The Strict Standard
In Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc., 59 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals adopted a decidedly different approach to subordinate bias
liability. The Fourth Circuit’s strict standard requires that the biased subordinate
be the “actual decisionmaker” or the one “principally responsible” for the
adverse employment decision in order to impute liability to the employer. 60 The
court in Hill explained that these requirements establish the outer limits for
holding employers liable under the cat’s paw theory, a result that sets a very
high benchmark for employees to meet. 61
Ethel Hill worked as an aircraft mechanic on a military base. 62 She claimed
that her supervisor, safety inspector Ed Fultz, harbored a discriminatory animus
against her, as evidenced by demeaning comments concerning her age and
gender, such as calling her a “troubled old lady,” a “useless old lady,” and “a
damn woman.” 63 Fultz reported Hill for various work rule infractions which
eventually led Lockheed Martin’s East Coast senior site supervisor, Archie
Griffin, to discharge Hill when she was fifty-seven years old. 64 Hill brought suit
claiming violations of Title VII and the ADEA, and the district court granted the
employer’s motion for summary judgment, noting Griffin’s lack of
discriminatory animus. 65 A divided Fourth Circuit panel initially reversed, but

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See supra text accompanying notes 40–57.
354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
Id. at 290.
See id. at 289–91.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 283 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 282–83.
Id. at 282–83.
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the court subsequently reheard the case en banc and, in a 7–4 decision, affirmed
the district court. 66
The majority in Hill began by noting that agency principles govern
employer liability under the two statutes. 67 The court then reviewed three
Supreme Court decisions that have interpreted the reach of these principles. 68
First, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 69 the Supreme Court had
explained that “by defining employer” covered by Title VII to include “any
agent,” Congress “‘evince[d] an intent to place some limits on the acts of
employees for which employers . . . are to be held responsible.’” 70 The Hill
court then turned to Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 71 a case in which the
Supreme Court considered the issue of an employer’s vicarious liability for the
sexually harassing acts of a supervisor. 72 In Ellerth, as well as in Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 73 a companion case, the Supreme Court had ruled that
employers are strictly liable where a supervisor inflicts harassment in the form
of a tangible employment action, such as a demotion or termination.74
According to the Hill majority, Ellerth “defined the limits of such agency as
encompassing employer liability for the acts of its employees holding
supervisory or other actual power to make tangible employment decisions.” 75
Finally, the Fourth Circuit discussed Reeves v. Sandiscon Plumbing Products,
Inc., 76 noting that the biased subordinate in that case was the actual
decisionmaker behind the plaintiff’s firing. 77 The Hill majority summarized the
import of Reeves in the following passage:
In sum, Reeves informs us that the person allegedly acting pursuant to a
discriminatory animus need not be the “formal decisionmaker” to
impose liability upon an employer for an adverse employment action,
so long as the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to establish that the

66. Id. at 283.
67. Id. at 286–87.
68. Id. at 287–88.
69. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
70. Hill, 354 F.3d at 287 (alterations in original) (quoting Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72).
71. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
72. Hill, 354 F.3d at 287 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763) (considering issue of vicarious
liability for acts of supervisors).
73. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
74. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764–65.
75. Hill, 354 F.3d at 287 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762).
76. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
77. Hill, 354 F.3d at 288–89 (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 152).
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subordinate was the one “principally responsible” for, or the “actual
decisionmaker” behind, the action. 78
The majority then turned its attention more specifically to the cat’s paw
theory. 79 Although citing Shager and Reeves favorably, the majority noted that
other courts have not described the cat’s paw theory consistently, “and rarely
have they done so after a discussion of the agency principles from which the
theory emerged and that limit its application.” 80 Applying agency principles, the
Fourth Circuit found it inappropriate to impute liability to an employer where a
biased subordinate, without supervisory or disciplinary authority, influences or
plays a role in the adverse employment decision. 81 Instead, the majority ruled
that cat’s paw liability is appropriate only if a biased subordinate both (1)
possesses “supervisory or disciplinary authority,” 82 and (2) is “the one
principally responsible for the [adverse] decision or the actual decisionmaker
for the employer.” 83 Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the Hill
majority found that Fultz, the biased subordinate, merely initiated the decision
making process that led to Hill’s termination, and thus did not meet the “actual
decisionmaker” threshold necessary to impute liability to Lockheed Martin. 84
Judge Michael filed a spirited dissent in which he claimed that the
majority’s decision renders Title VII and the ADEA “essentially toothless when
it comes to protecting employees against unlawful employment decisions that
are motivated by biased subordinates.” 85 Judge Michael contended that the
majority went astray in focusing primarily on principles of agency law, to the
detriment of what he saw as the key causation issue. 86 The dissent also took
issue with the majority’s transformation of Ellerth and Reeves from simple
examples of situations resulting in agency liability to the outer boundaries of
such liability. 87 In the end, the four dissenters endorsed the lenient standard,
stating that “when a biased subordinate has substantial influence on an
employment decision, the subordinate’s bias [should] be imputed to the formal
decisionmaker.” 88

78. Id. (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151–52).
79. Id. at 289.
80. Id. at 290.
81. See id. at 291.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 297.
85. Id. at 301 (Michael, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (“[The majority] overlooks the statutory focus on causation, that is, whether an
adverse employment action was taken “because of” a protected trait such as sex or age.”).
87. Id. at 302–04.
88. Id. at 304.
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As compared to the lenient standard, the Fourth Circuit’s strict approach
places a greater reliance on agency principles. These principles, at least
according to the Hill majority, make employers vicariously liable only for the
actions of subordinates with supervisory or disciplinary authority. The strict
standard also appears to utilize a but for model of causation. Under this
approach, an employer is not legally responsible for subordinate bias that might
play some motivating role in an adverse employment decision unless that
subordinate’s role rises to the level of the employer’s de facto principal
decisionmaker. The combination of these two requirements establishes a very
high threshold for subordinate bias liability.
C. The Intermediate Standards
More recently, two circuits have charted intermediate courses. Both the
Tenth and the Seventh Circuits have crafted standards that reject the Hill
approach, yet require a greater showing of causation than does the lenient
standard. While the views of the two circuits are not identical, both focus on
issues of causation and the role of an employer’s independent investigation.
In 2006, the Tenth Circuit forged a middle path in its EEOC v. BCI Coca–
Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles 89 decision. In that case, Stephen Peters, an
African-American, was terminated from his position as a merchandiser at a New
Mexico facility where more than 60% of the employees were Hispanic and less
than 2% were African-American. 90 The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) brought suit claiming BCI was liable for discriminatory
discharge under Title VII through cat’s paw liability. 91 The EEOC argued that
Peters’s immediate supervisor, Grado, who was Hispanic, displayed
discriminatory bias toward Peters and other African-American employees. 92
BCI argued that Grado was not involved in the termination process, and BCI,
therefore, could not be liable under Title VII. 93 Indeed, the termination decision
was made by a manager, Edgar, who was not even aware of Peters’s race. 94 The
district court granted summary judgment for the employer, but the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed. 95
The Tenth Circuit initially reviewed the existing subordinate bias liability
landscape. 96 The court disagreed with the “any influence” analysis used by

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S.Ct. 1931 (2007).
Id. at 478, 481.
Id. at 482.
Id.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 483, 493.
Id. at 484–88.
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those circuits following the lenient standard, stating that “[s]uch a weak
relationship between the subordinate’s actions and the ultimate employment
decision improperly eliminates a requirement of causation.” 97 But, the Tenth
Circuit also rejected the Fourth Circuit’s more restrictive approach, contending
that “agency law principles include[] not only ‘decisionmakers’ but other agents
whose actions, aided by the agency relation, cause injury.” 98 Having rejected
these two alternatives, the Tenth Circuit set its own course, stating that the key
issue in this context “is whether the biased subordinate’s discriminatory reports,
recommendation, or other actions caused the adverse employment action.” 99
The court also noted that this standard provides employers with an avenue to
avoid liability. 100 Because this standard requires a causal connection, an
employer can prevent liability by showing a break in the causation chain. 101
Thus, an employer avoids liability “by conducting an independent investigation
of the allegations against an employee.” 102 The court suggested that “simply
asking an employee for his version of events may [be sufficient to] defeat the
inference that an employment decision was racially discriminatory.” 103 In this
case, because the manager relied exclusively on information provided by Grado
and conducted no independent investigation beyond pulling Peters’s personnel
file, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment. 104
The Seventh Circuit also initially voiced its disapproval of Hill in a 2004
opinion. 105 But, three years later in Brewer v. Board of Trustees of the
University of Illinois, 106 the Seventh Circuit took a turn in Hill’s direction. The
court in Brewer reviewed its cat’s paw jurisprudence, noting that “our
approach . . . has not always been completely clear.” 107 Although the court
admitted that some earlier opinions had suggested that “any influence” over an
employment decision was sufficient to impose liability on an employer, it

97. Id. at 486–87.
98. Id. at 487.
99. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004)).
100. Id. at 488 (citing English v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1011 (10th Cir.
2001)).
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing English, 248 F.3d at 1011).
103. Id. (citing Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs. Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231–32 (10th Cir.
2000)).
104. Id. at 493.
105. See Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004) (“We are mindful that
Hill . . . holds that a subordinate’s influence, even substantial influence, over the supervisor’s
decision is not enough to impute the discriminatory motives of the subordinate to the supervisor;
the supervisor must be the subordinate’s ‘cat’s paw’ for such imputation to be permitted. That is
not the view of this court . . . .”).
106. 479 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 357 (2007).
107. Id. at 919.
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rejected “[t]hese dicta [as] doubtful.” 108 The Brewer court, instead, ruled that an
employer is liable only if a biased subordinate has a “‘singular influence’” over
the employment decision. 109 The court then nudged even closer to the Fourth
Circuit by stating that “[f]or a nominal non-decision-maker’s influence to put an
employer in violation of Title VII, the employee must possess so much
influence as to basically be herself the true ‘functional[] . . . decisionmaker.’” 110 Then, in a manner similar to the Tenth Circuit in BCI, the Seventh
Circuit stressed that even if a plaintiff establishes such a level of influence, “the
employer does not face Title VII liability so long as the decision maker
independently investigates the claims before acting.” 111
The BCI and Brewer decisions share some important features. Both
decisions adopt a causation threshold that requires a greater showing than the
lenient “influence” standard. 112 Additionally, both decisions underscore that an
independent investigation conducted by the ultimate decisionmaker is sufficient
to break the chain of causation. The devil here is in the details. The Tenth
Circuit in BCI did not explain what is required of a plaintiff in order to show
that a subordinate’s bias “caused” the adverse employment decision. Similarly,
neither decision provided much guidance as to what constitutes an adequate
employer investigation or under what circumstances such an investigation
should be expected or required. It is to these and other questions that we now
turn.
IV.

THREE CRUCIAL ISSUES

The three standards discussed above rely on very different theoretical and
policy foundations. Considerations of causation and corrective justice serve as
the foundation for the lenient standard. 113 The core notion here is that
employees should be afforded redress for employment decisions tainted by
workplace discrimination. 114 The strict standard is primarily grounded in
agency principles with the guiding objective being that an employer should not
be held liable for employees’ acts that are neither enabled by delegated
authority nor otherwise aided by the agency relationship. 115 Finally, the

108. Id.
109. Id. at 917 (citing Rozskowiak v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 415 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir.
2005)).
110. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Little v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 369 F.3d 1007,
1015 (7th Cir. 2004)).
111. Id. at 920.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 46–54.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 40–57.
114. See id.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 59–84.
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intermediate standard also pays homage to questions of causation, but with a
focus aimed more at prevention than redress. 116
Each of these foundational considerations has considerable merit. Rather
than endorsing any one of these principles to the detriment of the others,
however, a better approach is to attempt to achieve a balance among these
laudable principles. Toward that end, this Part examines these key objectives
sequentially by asking the following questions: (1) What is the appropriate
causation standard regarding the impact of the biased subordinate’s conduct?;
(2) When is the subordinate’s discriminatory bias properly attributable to the
employer?; and (3) What should be the impact of an employer’s investigation
into the underlying circumstances?
A. Causation
1. Proving Causation
As indicated above, federal antidiscrimination statutes generally prohibit an
employer or agent from discriminating “because of” an individual’s protected
trait. 117 Cases addressing the cat’s paw concept of liability implicate the realm
of disparate treatment rather than disparate impact forms of discrimination.118
Thus, the ultimate question in such cases “is whether the plaintiff was the victim
of intentional discrimination.” 119
A plaintiff can prove a claim of intentional discrimination through one of
two methods. The first is the three-part “pretext” framework set forth in the
seminal case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 120 Under that approach, a
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 121 Second, the
employer must respond with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

116. See supra text accompanying notes 89–111.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 1–3.
118. Claims of disparate treatment arise when an employer treats some people less
favorably because of their protected class status. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S.
44, 52 (2003) (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)).
Disparate impact claims, in contrast, involve employment practices that are facially neutral in
form, but which disproportionately disqualify members of a protected group in practice. See id.
(quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335–36 n.15).
119. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000).
120. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
121. Id. Typically, this step consists of proof that the employee (1) is a member of a
protected class; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) was discharged from the position; and (4)
was replaced by a nonmember of the protected class. See, e.g., id. (establishing the framework);
Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 654 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying the framework).
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decision. 122 This burden is only one of production and involves no credibility
assessments. 123 If the employer carries this burden, the presumption of
discrimination disappears, and the employee must then prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s proffered reason for its
action was a pretext for intentional discrimination. 124 The Supreme Court, in
two clarifying decisions, has held that a showing of pretext does not
automatically entitle an employee to judgment as a matter of law, 125 but the
plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with a showing that the employer’s
asserted justification is false, “may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the
employer unlawfully discriminated.” 126
The second proof method is the “mixed-motive” framework. In its 1989
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 127 the Supreme Court held that even if
an employee demonstrates that an employer considered an impermissible factor
such as age, race, sex, or disability in making an employment decision, the
employer may avoid liability by showing it would have made the same decision
even without consideration of the impermissible factor. 128 The burden of
persuasion shifts to the employer on this latter issue. 129
Congress, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, modified the Price Waterhouse
analysis by providing that liability under Title VII occurs if discrimination was
a motivating factor in the employer’s decision, even if the employer also was
motivated by a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. 130 Pursuant to the Act, an
employer’s showing that it would have made the same decision even if it had
not considered the impermissible factor serves only to limit the employee’s
remedies to injunctive and declaratory relief and, in appropriate cases,
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. 131
Following the lead of Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Price
Waterhouse, 132 most courts utilize the mixed-motive method of analysis in

122. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
123. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255–56 (1981).
124. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
125. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146–47 (2000) (citing
St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 519); St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 519 (“It is not enough . . . to disbelieve the
employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional discrimination.”).
126. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148.
127. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2m (2000)).
128. Id. at 244–45.
129. Id. at 246.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2000).
131. Id. § 2000e–5(g)(2)(B). The provision explicitly bars the award of damages and the
issuance of an order requiring admission, reinstatement, hiring, or promotion.
132. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“In my view, in order
to justify shifting the burden on the issue of causation to the defendant, a disparate treatment
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cases where plaintiffs present direct evidence of discrimination, 133 while
utilizing the McDonnell Douglas framework in cases involving only
circumstantial evidence of discrimination. 134 That dichotomy has been called
into question following the Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa. 135 In Desert Palace, the Supreme Court held that direct evidence is not
needed to meet the plaintiff’s burden. 136 Interpreting the 1991 Civil Rights Act
amendment, the Court said that “a plaintiff need only present sufficient [direct
or circumstantial] evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice.’” 137
The Desert Palace decision, on its face, clearly modifies the mixed-motive
framework. 138 Since Desert Palace, however, the circuit courts have disagreed
as to how Desert Palace affects the McDonnell Douglas framework. Some
circuits have held that Desert Place did not affect McDonnell Douglas, while
other circuits have held that, as a result of Desert Palace, the motivating factor
inquiry merges with the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. 139 Under
the latter approach, a trial court is likely to grant an employer’s motion for
summary judgment only if the employee fails to raise a genuine issue of
material fact concerning whether a protected characteristic was a motivating

plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the
decision.”).
133. Direct evidence , as contrasted with circumstantial evidence, refers to evidence that, if
believed, would prove the existence of discrimination without inferences or presumption. See, e.g.,
HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 3.2, at 115 (2001) (“Examples [of direct evidence] include epithets or slurs uttered by
an authorized agent of the employer, a decisionmaker’s admission that he would or did act against
the plaintiff because of his or her protected characteristic, or, even more clearly, an employer
policy framed squarely in terms of race, sex, religion, or national origin.”). There is widespread
disagreement as to what type of evidence is “direct” in nature. Id. at 117.
134. Steven J. Kaminshine, Disparate Treatment As a Theory of Discrimination: The Need
for a Restatement, Not a Revolution, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 28–29 (2005); see also Johnson v.
Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 865–66 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Because [the plaintiff] has failed to present
any direct evidence of discrimination, the burden-shifting approach first set forth in [McDonnell
Douglas] . . . applies to the present case.” (citing Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 572
(6th Cir.2000))); Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Absent
direct evidence of discriminatory intent, as is typically the case, proof via circumstantial evidence
is assembled using the framework set forth in the seminal case of [McDonnell Douglas]”).
135. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
136. Id. at 101–02.
137. Id. at 101 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2m (2000)).
138. See id. at 101–02.
139. See Kristina N. Klein, Comment, Oasis or Mirage? Desert Palace and its Impact on the
Summary Judgment Landscape, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1177, 1187 (2006) (discussing the Eighth
and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals’ approach to leave McDonnell Douglas unaffected, and the
Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals’ approach to alter McDonnell Douglas’s third prong).
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factor in the employment decision. 140 Some circuits have not applied the Desert
Palace holding to cases arising under the ADEA and continue to limit the
mixed-motive framework in the age discrimination context to cases entailing
direct evidence. 141
Regardless of the pertinent evidentiary framework, the bottom line in cases
of subordinate bias is that some causal link must be established between the
biased views of the subordinate and the adverse employment action. This link
can be accomplished through either framework. Under the pretext framework,
the plaintiff can argue that an employer’s asserted legitimate reason was
actually a pretext for discrimination harbored by a subordinate. 142 Under the
mixed-motive framework, the plaintiff can argue that, although there may have
been some legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the
subordinate’s bias played a motivating role in the decision. 143 Under either
framework, the ultimate question posed by Title VII is whether discrimination
was “a motivating factor” in the employer’s decision, 144 and both frameworks
are designed to provide an answer to that question. 145
2. Causation in the Context of Subordinate Bias Liability
The three subordinate bias liability standards discussed above utilize a
variety of causation tests. On one end of the spectrum, the lenient standard
requires only that the subordinate’s bias have some causal “influence” on the
resulting employment decision. 146 On the other end of the spectrum, the Fourth
Circuit’s strict standard finds causation satisfied only if the biased subordinate
is, for practical purposes, the “actual” or “principal” decisionmaker. 147 The two
intermediate decisions describe their respective causation requirements in

140. See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 315–16 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Such
comments preclude summary judgment because a rational finder of fact could conclude that age
played a role in [the supervisor’s] decision to terminate [the plaintiff].”).
141. See, e.g., Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. Corp., 391 F.3d 506, 512 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2004)
(“If direct evidence is used, the proponent of the evidence must satisfy the test laid out in Price
Waterhouse, in order to prove a violation of the ADEA.”); EEOC v. Warfield–Rohr Casket Co.,
Inc., 364 F.3d 160, 163 n.1 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[D]irect evidence is still a prerequisite for a mixedmotive analysis in ADEA cases.”). But see Rachid, 376 F.3d at 311 (applying the reasoning of
Desert Palace in an ADEA case).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 120–126.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 127–141.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2000).
145. See, e.g., Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
109, 134–38 (2008) (asserting that the McDonnell Douglas test, similar to the mixed-motive
framework, proves “motivating factor” causation rather than “but for” causation).
146. See discussion supra Part III.A.
147. See discussion supra Part III.B.

20

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 60:___

different terms. The Tenth Circuit requires that the subordinate bias “cause” the
resulting harm, but the court does not describe how that step should be
accomplished. 148 The Seventh Circuit, meanwhile, requires a showing of
“singular influence” akin to that of the “functional[] . . . decision-maker,”
bringing it nearer to the Fourth Circuit’s approach on this issue. 149
The most appropriate causation test is the one that replicates the language
of Title VII itself. That is, an employment action may be deemed to be “because
of” discrimination where subordinate bias operates as “a motivating factor” of
the employer’s employment action. 150 Since this test tracks the core requirement
of Title VII causation, it is most likely to effectuate the causal touchstone
envisioned by Congress. 151
The lenient standard’s “any influence” test 152 sometimes falls short of this
benchmark. It is true, of course, that subordinate bias that “influences” 153 an
employment decision will often be “a motivating factor” 154 of such a decision.
But, to the extent that the lenient standard imposes liability in circumstances
where the influence in question does not rise to the level of a factor that actually
motivates the employer’s decision, the Tenth Circuit’s criticism in BCI that such
a “weak relationship . . . improperly eliminates a requirement of causation” 155 is
well taken.
However, both the Hill and Brewer decisions go too far in the opposite
direction. To the extent that these decisions require that a biased subordinate
serve as a “principal,” “actual,” or “functional” decisionmaker, 156 they
essentially impose a “but for” causation requirement. But for causation
contemplates a causal connection that is definitive or necessary in nature, such
that the event in question would not have occurred but for that specific factor.157
As the Supreme Court noted in Price Waterhouse, Title VII’s “because of”
language, even prior to the 1991 amendment, did not require a showing of but

148. See supra text accompanying notes 99–104.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 109–111.
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1), (m) (2000).
151. See, e.g., Sadki v. SUNY Coll. at Brockport, 310 F. Supp. 2d 506, 519 (W.D.N.Y.
2004) (finding that evidence created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a biased
subordinate’s actions so influenced a formal decisionmaker’s conclusion “that her discriminatory
animus became a motivating factor in the ultimate decision” (emphasis added)).
152. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 46–54.
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2m (2000).
155. EEOC v. BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 486–87 (10th
Cir. 2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 59–60.
157. Katz, supra note 145, at 121.
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for causation. 158 And, such a requirement certainly compels a greater degree of
proof than does the “motivating factor” language added by the Civil Rights Act
of 1991. 159 As Professor Martin Katz notes, the motivating factor standard is
“minimally causal,” as compared to a but for standard, requiring only that a
factor have a tendency to bring about a certain outcome. 160 By imposing a more
onerous causation standard for subordinate bias cases than that embodied in
Title VII, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits effectively immunize employment
decisions that Congress meant to prohibit.
The Hill court attempted to justify this higher standard by maintaining that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Reeves mandated the “actual decisionmaker”
standard. 161 While it is true that the Court in Reeves described the formal
decisionmaker’s husband as the “actual decisionmaker,” 162 the use of that
phrase was more likely descriptive of the evidence presented in that case than a
pronouncement of legal principle. As the Tenth Circuit noted in BCI, the
majority in Hill misinterpreted Reeves, taking the term “actual decisionmaker”
as setting the outer boundaries of liability, when in fact this language was used
only to describe the subordinate’s role in the particular fact pattern presented. 163
Policy considerations provide further support for preferring a motivating
factor standard over an actual decisionmaker standard. Federal
antidiscrimination statutes serve two primary purposes: to compensate the
victims of discrimination and to deter the occurrence of discrimination in the
workplace. 164 As remedial legislation, these statutes should be interpreted
broadly in order to effectuate these purposes. 165
The Supreme Court has explained that the purpose behind the compensation
goal of antidiscrimination statutes is “to restore the employee to the position he

158. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2m
(2000)).
159. Katz, supra note 145, at 121–22.
160. Katz, supra note 145, at 121.
161. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 288–89 (4th Cir. 2004).
162. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 152 (2000).
163. EEOC v. BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 487 (10th Cir.
2006).
164. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–2m (2000)) (stating Congress’s “Findings” and “Purposes” for amending the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); see also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357–58
(1995) (stating that both Title VII and the ADEA seek to remove discrimination from the work
place and compensate victims of workplace injustice); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 417–18 (1975) (stating that the primary objectives of Title VII are to equalize employment
opportunities and “to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment
discrimination”).
165. See EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 240 F.3d 899, 899 (11th Cir. 2001).
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or she would have been in absent the discrimination.” 166 When a subordinate’s
bias acts as a motivating factor for an adverse employment decision, the
victimized employee suffers harm resulting from discrimination. Yet, if the
subordinate’s bias falls short of constituting the act of an ultimate
decisionmaker, the Fourth Circuit’s standard would not redress the employee’s
loss. As Judge Michael noted in his dissenting opinion in Hill, the Fourth
Circuit’s strict causation standard “removes an entire class of discrimination
cases from the protection” of antidiscrimination statutes with the result that
“unlawful discrimination will go unaddressed in many cases.” 167
The strict standard also fails to further the deterrent purpose of federal
antidiscrimination statutes. In the context of cases involving subordinate bias,
discriminatory employment actions often take place even though the formal
decisionmaker is unaware of the subordinate’s underlying motives. Without any
meaningful threat of liability, employers will have little incentive to create
processes to prevent and uncover these situations. A more accessible motivating
factor test likely will “have the salutary effect of encouraging employers to
verify information and review recommendations before taking adverse
employment actions against members of protected groups.” 168
Similarly, but in the opposite direction, a less accessible causation test—
such as the Fourth Circuit’s strict standard—may provide employers with an
incentive to design decision making processes that intentionally mask the
underlying discriminatory motive as a basis to avoid liability. An employer, for
example, may set up “many layers of pro forma review” as a means to insulate
itself from potential subordinate bias. 169 It would not serve the deterrent
purpose of antidiscrimination statutes to encourage such “willful blindness” of
subordinate motives as a defensive human resources strategy. 170

166. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362 (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747,
764 (1976)).
167. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 304 (4th Cir. 2004)
(Michael, J., dissenting).
168. EEOC v. BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 486 (10th Cir.
2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007). In addition, the Tenth Circuit stated, “The Fourth
Circuit’s standard also undermines the deterrent effect of subordinate bias claims, allowing
employers to escape liability even when a subordinate’s discrimination is the sole cause of an
adverse employment action, on the theory that the subordinate did not exercise complete control
over the decisionmaker.” Id. at 487.
169. Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing
Gusman v. Unisys Corp., 986 F.2d 1146, 1147 (7th Cir.1993)); see also Russell v. McKinney
Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227 n.13 (5th Cir. 2000) (“If . . . we adhered to a rigid formalistic
application, employers could easily insulate themselves from liability by ensuring that the one who
performed the employment action was isolated from the employee, thus eviscerating the spirit of
the ‘actual decisionmaker’ guideline.”).
170. See BCI, 450 F.3d at 486 (“Recognition of subordinate bias claims forecloses a
strategic option for employers who might seek to evade liability, even in the face of rampant race
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In sum, the motivating factor test represents the causation standard that is
most consistent with the language and purposes of federal antidiscrimination
statutes. This standard will absolve employers from liability for decisions that
are not actually motivated by discrimination, while affording redress for those
decisions in which unlawful discrimination plays a motivating role.
B. Agency Principles
1. Employer Responsibility for the Acts of Its Agents
A second key issue concerns when an employer should bear legal
responsibility for the biased acts of subordinate employees. As noted above, the
prohibition contained in federal antidiscrimination statutes extends only to
actions undertaken by an “employer” and “any agents” of an employer. 171 Thus,
even if a biased subordinate’s actions can be linked in a causal sense with an
adverse employment action, the question remains as to whether the subordinate
is acting as an agent of the employer such that the subordinate’s conduct is
legally attributable to the employer for liability purposes. 172
In general, an employer may be liable under federal antidiscrimination
statutes in one of two ways. First, an employer may be directly liable for its own
actions, such as where a corporate board of directors adopts a policy that
adversely affects members of a protected group. 173 Second, and alternatively, an
employer may be vicariously liable for the discriminatory acts of its agents. 174
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 175 the Supreme Court discussed
these two bases for employer liability in the context of sexual harassment. The
Court initially recognized that “[n]egligence sets a minimum standard for

discrimination among subordinates, through willful blindness as to the source of reports and
recommendations.” (citing Russell, 235 F.3d at 227 n.13)).
171. See supra text accompanying note 5.
172. See, e.g., Razzaghi, supra note 16, at 1713(citing Hill, 354 F.3d at 287) (“[W]hether a
subordinate employee who influences the employer’s decision to terminate the plaintiff can
properly be defined as an ‘employer’ or an ‘agent,’ rests in an analysis of agency principles.”).
173. See, e.g., Levendos v. Stern Entm’t, Inc., 909 F.2d 747, 751 (3d Cir. 1990)
(“[D]iscrimination is rarely carried out pursuant to a formal vote of a corporation’s board of
directors. . . . Nonetheless, Title VII remedies . . . generally run against the employer as an
entity.”).
174. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 766 (1998) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court today manufactures a rule that employers are vicariously liable if
supervisors create a sexually hostile work environment . . . .”); Levendos v. Stern Entm’t, Inc., 909
F.2d 747, 751 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[D]iscriminatory policies violative of Title VII, acts that may
constitute Title VII violations are generally effected through the actions of individuals, and often
an individual may take such a step even in defiance of company policy.”).
175. 524 U.S. at 742.
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employer liability under Title VII.” 176 Under the negligence standard, a court
may hold an employer liable where the employer’s own negligence is the cause
of the harassment. 177 For example, an employer will be liable for the
harassment caused by a coworker or a supervisor acting outside the scope of
employment if the employer “knew or should have known about the conduct
and failed to stop it.” 178
The Court then explained that although negligence may be a source of
direct liability, the plaintiff in Ellerth had raised a different issue: whether an
employer could be strictly liable for harassment undertaken by a supervisor.179
The Court responded in the affirmative, ruling that employers are vicariously
and strictly liable where a supervisor with immediate authority over the
employee creates an actionable hostile environment resulting in a “tangible
employment action.” 180 A “tangible employment action,” according to the
Court, is “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or
a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” 181 The Court rationalized
imposing strict liability upon the employer by explaining that a supervisor
cannot make a tangible employment decision absent an agency relationship;
therefore, “[t]angible employment actions are the means by which the
supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on
subordinates.” 182
The Court, however, limited its holding by stating that an employer should
not be subject to strict liability when a supervisor’s harassment does not take the
form of a “tangible employment action.” 183 In this context, the employer may
raise an affirmative defense to liability or to damages. 184 Under the affirmative
defense, the employer must prove both “that the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior” and “that
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative
or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise.” 185 As subsequent decisions illustrate, this defense is most often

176. Id. at 759.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 765.
181. Id. at 761.
182. Id. at 761–62. The Court had initially noted, “Tangible employment actions fall within
the special province of the supervisor. The supervisor has been empowered by the company as a
distinct class of agent to make economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her
control.” Id. at 762.
183. Id. at 765.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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established where an employer establishes an antiharassment policy and an
employee claiming harassment fails to use that policy to report the alleged
harassment. 186
Although the exact scope of vicarious liability under antidiscrimination
statutes is uncertain, some basic principles are clear. First, Congress, by
defining a covered employer for purposes of antidiscrimination statutes to
include “any agent” of the employer, “evince[d] an intent to place some limits
on the acts of employees for which employers . . . are to be held responsible.” 187
In other words, an employer is not liable for each and every discriminatory act
committed by one of its employees. Second, because discrimination is in the
nature of a statutory tort, an employer is liable for the intentional acts
committed by its employees within the scope of employment when the
employee is motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer. 188
However, an employer is also vicariously liable for employee acts taken outside
the scope of employment—such as acts of sexual harassment that are not
undertaken in order to serve the employer’s interests 189 —only if the employee
“was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.” 190
2. Agency Principles in the Context of Subordinate Bias Liability
The circuit courts, here again, have taken a wide variety of approaches with
respect to the issue of agency liability. Those circuits following the lenient
standard tend not to discuss agency principles at all. 191 These courts generally

186. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort & Sarah J. Gorajski, When Quitting is Fitting: The Need
for a Reformulated Sexual Harassment/Constructive Discharge Standard in the Wake of
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 593, 632 (2006) (“A statistical analysis of
published federal court decisions issued after Ellerth and Faragher concludes that ‘employees can
almost guarantee a [summary judgment] victory for the employer if they fail to report.’” (alteration
in original) (quoting David Sherwyn, Michael Heise, & Zev J. Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees
and Cancel Your “1-800” Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the
Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265,
1286 (2001))).
187. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
188. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793 (1998) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1)(c) (1958)); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 505 (5th ed. 1984).
189. See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 798–801 (finding such acts of sexual harassment not to
be taken in the course of employment).
190. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d)
(1958)); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802 (“[Restatement § 219] covers not only cases involving
the abuse of apparent authority, but also cases in which tortious conduct is made possible or
facilitated by the existence of the actual agency relationship.”).
191. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 290 (4th Cir.
2004) (“[W]hile the courts often utilize the same terminology as that employed by the Shager
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find that employer liability automatically follows once causation is established.
Given the lack of overt discussion, it is not clear whether these courts view the
agency link as established by virtue of the actions of the biased subordinate or
by virtue of the actions of the ultimate decisionmaker. The Seventh Circuit in
Shager, one of the few decisions to address agency concerns, seems to have
adopted the former view. The Shager court stated,
But a supervisory employee who [by influencing a formal
decisionmaker] fires a subordinate is doing the kind of thing that he is
authorized to do, and the wrongful intent with which he does it does not
carry his behavior so far beyond the orbit of his responsibilities as to
excuse the employer. 192
In essence, the court in Shager found that, unlike errant acts of coworker
harassment, the biased acts of a subordinate taken pursuant to delegated
authority are within the scope of employment and are attributable to the
employer by means of respondeat superior. 193
The Fourth Circuit, in contrast, relied on agency principles to limit
employer liability to situations where a biased subordinate has “supervisory or
disciplinary authority” and is “the one principally responsible for the [adverse]
decision or the actual decisionmaker for the employer.” 194 By this ruling, the
Hill majority construed the Supreme Court’s Ellerth decision as establishing the
outer contours of agency liability, such that an employer may be vicariously
liable only for the acts of supervisors that result in a tangible employment
action. 195 The Hill court’s unstated premise is that acts of subordinate bias
necessarily fall outside the scope of employment and only may be attributed to

court, they have not always described the theory in consistent ways, and rarely have they done so
after a discussion of the agency principles from which the theory emerged and that limit its
application.”).
192. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958)).
193. Id. at 404–405. The Shager court went on to state,
Concern with the futility of derivative liability is absent where the challenged action is
not harassment, whether on sexual or other grounds by a fellow employee, but discharge
by a supervisory employee. The deliberate act of an employee acting within the scope of
his authority is the act of the employer, for an employer, at least where it is a
corporation, acts only through agents.
Id. at 404 (citing Hunter v. Allis–Chalmers Corp., Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir.
1986); North v. Madison Area Ass’n for Retarded Citizens–Developmental Ctrs. Corp., 844 F.2d
401, 407 (7th Cir. 1988)).
194. Hill, 354 F.3d at 291.
195. Id. at 287 (stating that Ellerth “defined the limits of such agency as encompassing
employer liability for the acts of its employees holding supervisory or other actual power to make
tangible employment decisions” (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762)).
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an employer who has empowered the subordinate through the delegation of
supervisory authority.
The Tenth Circuit in BCI once again charted a middle course with respect
to the agency issue. Chiding the Fourth Circuit for its more restrictive approach,
the BCI court found that “agency law principles include[] not only
‘decisionmakers’ but other agents whose actions, aided by the agency relation,
cause injury.” 196 The Tenth Circuit noted, as examples, those employees with
delegated “authority to monitor performance, report disciplinary infractions, and
recommend employment actions.” 197 The Tenth Circuit, accordingly, appears to
have assumed that acts of subordinate bias may fall outside the scope of
employment, but that an employee’s misuse of some form of delegated
authority—although not necessarily supervisory authority—is necessary for
such actions to be imputed to the employer. The Tenth Circuit’s analysis of the
agency issue is the best approach. Its focus on the misuse of delegated authority
is superior to the extremes of the other two standards.
A fundamental problem with the lenient standard is that it essentially
jettisons the agency issue altogether. This is inappropriate, as the Supreme
Court has expressly cautioned that the inclusion of the term “agents” in the
statutory definition of a covered employer in antidiscrimination statutes was
intended to serve as a limitation on the reach of employer liability for employee
conduct. 198 To the extent that the lenient standard makes employers liable for
the biased acts of any and all employees, the standard improperly ignores this
limitation.
As a matter of policy, one of the principal purposes of the agency limitation
is to make employers legally responsible only for the discriminatory acts of
employees that it reasonably may have prevented. 199 Thus, employers are not
liable for the harassing acts of its rank-and-file employees unless the employer
knew or should have known about such conduct and failed to take steps to curb
it. 200 The same concern exists in the context of subordinate bias. Consider, for
example, the situation of an employee with no delegated authority who, acting

196. EEOC v. BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 487 (10th Cir.
2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007) (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760). The Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Brewer v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 479 F.3d 908 (7th
Cir. 2007), the other decision adopting an intermediate standard for subordinate bias liability, did
not address the agency issue.
197. BCI, 450 F.3d at 485.
198. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986); see also Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 791–92 (1998) (noting that the traditional parameters of agency law
delimit the reach of employer liability).
199. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he ultimate concern is
with confining the employer’s or principal’s liability to the general class of cases in which he has
the practical ability to head off the injury to his employee’s, or other agent’s, victim.”).
200. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
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on discriminatory bias, surreptitiously intercepts and alters a supervisor’s
performance evaluation of a fellow employee. Unless the employer has reason
to suspect the alteration, it should not automatically be liable for consequences
it did not set in motion.
The Seventh Circuit’s discussion in Shager of employer liability for biased
actions taken by a subordinate in the course of employment is not to the
contrary. 201 In Shager, the subordinate employee in question was a lower level
supervisor to whom the employer had delegated the authority to make
disciplinary recommendations. 202 When the Shager court described the
supervisor’s biased actions as taken in the course of employment, it likely was
referring to the fact that the employer’s grant of such delegated authority aided
the supervisor’s actions. 203 That does not mean, however, that the biased
manipulations of employees with no delegated authority should automatically
be attributed to the employer on a respondeat superior basis.
While the lenient standard sets too low of a bar for agency liability, the
strict standard errs in the opposite direction. Here again, the Fourth Circuit in
Hill inappropriately construed a Supreme Court decision as establishing the
outer boundaries of potential liability. In Ellerth, the Supreme Court held that an
employer is strictly liable for a supervisor’s workplace harassment that takes the
form of a tangible employment action. 204 The Fourth Circuit seized upon this
ruling to conclude that an employer only may be held liable for subordinate bias
when the subordinate is a supervisor who serves as the principal or the ultimate
decisionmaker concerning a tangible employment action. 205 But, the Ellerth
Court did not limit the reach of potential employer liability solely to that set of
circumstances. 206 The Ellerth Court, instead, found that “[w]hatever the exact
contours of the aided in the agency relation standard, its requirements will
always be met when a supervisor takes a tangible employment action against a
subordinate.” 207 Beyond that zone of automatic liability, the Supreme Court
noted that other circumstances also might implicate the agency relation, but that
the outcome in such cases “is less obvious.” 208

201. See supra text accompanying notes 192–193.
202. Shager, 913 F.2d at 399–400.
203. Id. at 405 (“But a supervisory employee who fires a subordinate is doing the kind of
thing that he is authorized to do . . . .”).
204. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762–63.
205. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 291 (4th Cir. 2004).
206. See Razzaghi, supra note 16, at 1736 (“The Court in Ellerth, however, never limited
vicarious liability to acts of one who was principally responsible for the adverse employment
action . . . .”).
207. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762–63.
208. Id. at 763.
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Of particular significance is the fact that the Ellerth Court made its ruling in
the context of determining the grounds for strictly imposing liability on an
employer. 209 However, subordinate bias liability poses a different issue. 210 The
issue here, instead, is whether an employer potentially may be liable for an
adverse act set in motion by a biased subordinate. Just as an employer may be
held liable for an agent’s harassing conduct beyond those circumstances
warranting strict liability—such as where an employer is unable to establish the
two-part affirmative defense—so too should an employer face possible liability
for the misuse of delegated authority by a subordinate in circumstances beyond
the narrow confines of the Ellerth strict liability test.
The Ellerth decision ultimately stands for the proposition that an employer
may be liable for agency purposes when an employee misuses delegated
authority that results in an adverse employment action. 211 In policy terms, the
crucial point is that an employer may appropriately face potential liability when
it has empowered an employee with authority that carries with it the potential to
inflict injury. 212 The misuse of delegated authority by a supervisor who acts as a
principal decisionmaker certainly falls within the parameters of this prohibition;
it does not, however, exhaust the universe of such possibilities. The misuse of
other types of delegated authority also may enable employees—including on
occasion nonsupervisors—to inflict economic injury on their fellow
employees. 213 Consider, for example, the case of an employer who empowers
an employee with no formal supervisory authority over another employee to

209. See id. at 764–65.
210. See Hill, 354 F.3d at 302 (Michael, J., dissenting) (“Ellerth simply tells us that when a
supervisor or other decisionmaker fires an employee for whatever reason, we automatically have
an agent whose personnel action is imputed to the employer. That does not answer today’s
question: when a biased subordinate who lacks decisionmaking authority substantially influences
an employment decision, may his bias be imputed to the formal decisionmaker who acts for the
employer. I would hold that it can be.”).
211. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760–65.
212. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) cmt. e (1958) (explaining that the
aided by the “agency relation” standard of section 219(2) applies to situations where “the servant
may be able to cause harm because of his position as agent”); see also EEOC v. BCI Coca–Cola
Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 485 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931
(2007) (“The ‘aided by the agency relation’ standard applies even more clearly to subordinate bias
claims, such as ‘cat’s paw’ or ‘rubber stamp’ claims, because the allegedly biased subordinate
accomplishes his discriminatory goals by misusing the authority granted to him by the
employer . . . .”).
213. See, e.g., BCI, 450 F.3d at 487 (“[T]he issue is whether the biased subordinate’s
discriminatory reports, recommendations, or other actions caused the adverse employment action.”
(citing Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004))); Razzaghi, supra note 16, at 1729–
30 (“While in some of these cases the biased employees may have had certain supervisory
authority, the courts never considered that authority as a precondition to imputing liability to the
employers.”).
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make a recommendation on matters such as promotion or discipline. Even if the
recommender does not serve as a principal decisionmaker on that issue,
employer liability may be appropriate if the recommender’s misuse of that
lesser form of delegated authority serves as a motivating factor in an adverse
employment action. 214 Indeed, the EEOC has expressly endorsed that position
in an enforcement guidance. 215
In the end, this Article argues that the Tenth Circuit’s decision in BCI
provides the proper balance for gauging agency liability. Such liability should
not extend overbroadly to the actions of all employees or be limited too
narrowly to only those supervisors who act as ultimate decisionmakers. The
test, instead, should focus on whether a biased subordinate misuses authority
delegated by an employer as a means of causing an adverse employment action.
C. Employer Investigation
While the two circuits championing an intermediate path with respect to
subordinate bias liability expressly describe the impact of an employer’s
investigation as part of their proposed analytical framework, 216 there is broad
agreement among all viewpoints that such an investigation can play a major role
in assessing the propriety of imposing employer liability. The core notion here
is that an employer’s investigation into the circumstances underlying the
allegations made by a biased subordinate can serve to break the chain of
causation by removing the taint of discrimination introduced by the
subordinate’s actions. 217

214. See, e.g., Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226–29 (5th Cir. 2000)
(finding that allegedly biased influence of a subordinate employee may be imputed to employer
with respect to an adverse action suffered by someone in a coordinate position).
215. EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful
Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Comp. Man. (BNA) No. 915.002, at 17 (June 18, 1999),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html (stating that an individual may be a
“supervisor” if his job includes recommending “tangible job decisions affecting an employee” and
those recommendations are given “substantial weight by the final decisionmaker[s]”).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 90–111.
217. See, e.g., English v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1011 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[The
employer’s] attempt to balance the investigators’ findings with [the plaintiff’s] own version of
events cuts off any alleged bias on the part of the investigators from the chain of events leading to
English’s termination. Therefore, the cat’s paw doctrine does not apply in this case.”); Long v.
Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1996) (“If [the employer] based his decisions on his own
independent investigation, the causal link between [the biased subordinates’] allegedly retaliatory
intent and [the plaintiffs’] terminations would be broken.”); Wilson v. Stroh Cos., Inc., 952 F.2d
942, 946 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[The employer] had conducted an independent investigation of [the
plaintiff’s] conduct. . . . The causal nexus necessary to support [the plaintiff’s] prima facie case is
absent.”).
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Both the Tenth and the Seventh Circuits give the role of an employer’s
investigation—or lack thereof—center stage in determining the reach of
subordinate bias liability. The Tenth Circuit in BCI stated that an employer can
avoid liability “by conducting an independent investigation of the allegations
against an employee.” 218 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit stressed that even if a
plaintiff makes out a singular level of influence by a biased subordinate, “the
employer does not face Title VII liability so long as the decisionmaker
independently investigates the claims before acting.” 219
Courts following both the lenient and the strict standards have also
recognized that an independent investigation of a subordinate’s allegations may
serve to insulate an employer from liability. At least four circuits following the
lenient standard have expressly recognized the possibility of an investigation
defense. 220 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Hill, in explaining that the biased
subordinate was not the actual decisionmaker, stated, “[I]t is undisputed that
Dixon personally investigated and verified the accuracy of the discrepancy
reports, and made an independent, non-biased decision . . . that the infractions
were sufficiently serious to warrant . . . termination.” 221
Given the nearly universal recognition of the importance of an employer’s
investigation into subordinate bias liability, the crucial questions concerning this
topic devolve into two subsidiary issues. First, what type of an investigation is
sufficient to dissipate the taint of subordinate bias? Second, when should an
employer be expected or required to undertake such an investigation?
1. Type of Investigation
As the Fourth Circuit’s articulation suggests, the general requirement for a
causation-breaking investigation is that it be a fair and independent examination

218. EEOC v. BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 488 (10th Cir.
2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (citing English, 248 F.3d at 1011).
219. Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 920 (7th Cir. 2007).
220. See, e.g., Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Thus, if an adverse
employment action is the consequence of an entirely independent investigation by an employer, the
animus of the retaliating employee is not imputed to the employer.”); Llampallas v. Mini–Circuits,
Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1250 (11th Cir. 1998) (“When the employer makes an effort to determine
the employee’s side of the story before making a tangible employment decision affecting that
employee, however, it should not be held liable under Title VII for that decision based only on its
employee’s hidden discriminatory motives.”); Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807(6th Cir.
1998) (“[T]he key inquiry is whether the employer made a reasonably informed and considered
decision before taking an adverse employment action.”); Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 307
(5th Cir. 1996) (“If [the employer] based his decisions on his own independent investigation, the
causal link between [the biased subordinates’] allegedly retaliatory intent and [the plaintiffs’]
terminations would be broken.”).
221. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 296 (4th Cir. 2004).
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of circumstances underlying the contemplated employment action.222 As a
conceptual matter, an investigation is fair and independent if it serves to replace
the influence of a subordinate’s bias with the untainted determination of an
unbiased ultimate decisionmaker. 223 That goal, of course, is easier to state than
are the particulars of what constitutes a fair and independent investigation on a
ground level.
In this regard, it is important to recognize that the mere fact that an
unbiased decisionmaker undertakes an investigation may not necessarily have
the effect of dispelling the taint of subordinate bias. Social psychology research
suggests that once a lower level supervisor offers a recommendation, “it can
reasonably be expected to influence the ultimate decision maker’s judgment in a
recommendation-consistent direction, even if he conducts his own
investigation.” 224 This phenomenon, known as expectancy confirmation bias,
derives from the likelihood that the decisionmaker will give deference to the
supervisor’s view of the situation due to the supervisor’s more highly influential
position in the corporate power structure. 225 As a result, the independent
investigation itself may be tainted with bias because “once the decisionmaker
receives any complaints, reports, or recommendations from the supervisor, her
judgment may be anchored to the information therein, and she may then search
for information and process it in a manner tending to recreate the supervisor’s
bias.” 226 Thus, some commentators suggest that an investigation can succeed at
purging the taint of subordinate bias only by “explicitly considering the
possibility that bias had influenced the process at its earlier stages.” 227 A bias-

222. See id.; Razzaghi, supra note 16, at 1732–34.
223. See, e.g., Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547–48 (7th Cir.
1997) (“[I]t is clear that, when the causal relationship between the subordinate’s illicit motive and
the employer’s ultimate decision is broken, and the ultimate decision is clearly made on an
independent and legally permissive basis, the basis of the subordinate is not relevant.” (citing Long
v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1996))); Recent Cases: Tenth Circuit Clarifies
Causation Standard for Subordinate Bias Claims, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1699, 1702–06 (2007)
[hereinafter Tenth Circuit Clarifies Standard] (“The BCI court should have . . . held that
independent investigations immunize employers from subordinate bias liability only when the
decisionmaker consciously seeks out evidence of the supervisor’s bias and actively correctives for
its effects on the investigation and the decision.”).
224. White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 524.
225. See, e.g., id. at 525 (“[R]esearch has demonstrated quite convincingly that when
presented with a claim (i.e., Mary is a poor performer and should be fired), people tend to treat the
claim as a tentative hypothesis and proceed to test that hypothesis by searching for evidence that
will confirm it.”); see also Monica J. Harris, et al., Awareness of Power as a Moderator of
Expectancy Confirmation: Who’s the Boss Around Here?, 20 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
220 (1998) (“People tend to defer to those who are in positions of higher power, and that deference
may include confirming the expectations of the others.”).
226. Tenth Circuit Clarifies Standard, supra note 223, at 1703.
227. White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 527.
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conscious investigation often will be necessary to eradicate the causal effect of
subordinate bias.
The existing case law provides some guidance as to the type of
investigations that courts have found to be adequate or, in contrast, inadequate.
The Eleventh Circuit in Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa 228 found that an
employer’s three-day evidentiary hearing, complete with legal counsel and
witnesses before a three-member panel of neutral decisionmakers, clearly
passed muster. 229 Most courts that have considered the issue also have found
that a face-to-face meeting, or an offer of such a meeting, between the formal
decisionmaker and the employee alleging discrimination is sufficient to break
the chain of causation. 230 In this regard, the Tenth Circuit in BCI stated in
dictum that “under our precedent, simply asking an employee for his version of
events may defeat the inference that an employment decision was racially
discriminatory.” 231 Finally, some courts’ decisions have suggested that an
independent examination of the underlying circumstances may be sufficient
even without a personal interview of the individual about to be disciplined. 232
While less attention has been devoted to describing instances in which
investigations are not adequate to dispel subordinate bias liability, courts have
identified at least two such circumstances. First, a formal decisionmaker cannot
justify the investigation defense simply by meeting with the biased subordinate
to discuss the subordinate’s recommendation. 233 That step is likely to

228. 186 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 1999).
229. See id. at 1330–31.
230. See, e.g., English v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1011 (10th Cir. 2001) (“A
plaintiff cannot claim that a firing authority relied uncritically upon a subordinate’s prejudiced
recommendation where the plaintiff had an opportunity to respond to and rebut the evidence
supporting the recommendation.”); Llampallas v. Mini–Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1249–
50 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that an employer’s meeting with the employee broke the chain of
causation between the supervisor’s harassment and the employer’s decision to terminate
employee); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547–48 (7th Cir. 1997)
(finding that the chain of causation was broken by the employer’s “proactive involvement” in
investigating the claims and by employer affording the employee numerous opportunities to
explain the alleged misconduct).
231. EEOC v. BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 488 (10th Cir.
2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (citing Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d
1220, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 2000)).
232. Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 919 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that a
decisionmaker’s examination of underlying evidence of wrongdoing was sufficient even without a
follow up interview with the target employee); see also Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 877
(6th Cir. 2003) (Rosen, J., dissenting) (suggesting that an ultimate decisionmaker’s investigation
should be deemed adequate when her assessment of employee job performance is “informed
principally by her own direct, repeated, and unchallenged observations”).
233. See, e.g., Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 857 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A
biased subordinate] was involved directly in the disciplinary process. He serves as plaintiffs’ Skelly
hearings officer . . . .”). It is likely that the purported investigation in the Fourth Circuit’s Hill
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exacerbate rather than alleviate the taint of subordinate bias. Second, the Tenth
Circuit in BCI stated that the mere review of a personnel file by a decisionmaker
did not constitute an adequate investigation where the file did not provide
background information concerning the allegations asserted by the biased
subordinate. 234
In general, an employer who receives a subordinate’s recommendation for
an adverse employment action would be well advised to engage in a personal
interview of the subject of the recommendation. In some instances, however, a
personal interview, by itself, may not necessarily establish such a defense.235
For example, a decisionmaker might conduct only a perfunctory interview or
fail to follow through by examining key exculpatory evidence identified by the
employee during the interview. Similarly, a decisionmaker might conduct the
interview under circumstances that are overly intimidating or otherwise not
conducive to a fair and meaningful exchange of information. In circumstances
such as these, the mere fact that an interview took place might not serve to
remove the taint of subordinate bias.
A fair and independent investigation need not be an onerous undertaking.
An employer should not be expected to hold a full-blown evidentiary hearing of
the type utilized in Stimpson 236 or to follow up on each and every explanation
offered by an employee during an interview. 237 Indeed, it should not even be a
prerequisite for the decisionmaker to reach a “correct” conclusion. 238 The
touchstone, instead, should be whether the decisionmaker has taken sufficient

decision also would be found inadequate by most courts since the ultimate decisionmaker in that
case relied on a requested report from the biased subordinate rather than a face-to-face interview
with the employee under scrutiny. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d
277, 296 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Razzaghi, supra note 16, at 1734 (“[B]y simply relying on
Fultz’s report as the basis for the decision to terminate Hill, his inquiry falls short of an
independent investigation.”).
234. BCI, 450 F.3d at 492–93.
235. Tenth Circuit Clarifies Standard, supra note 223, at 1706 (“[M]erely asking the
employee for her side of the story . . . will not always root out the possible discriminatory motives
of the supervisor that may have influenced the independent investigation.”); see also Susan Sturm,
Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
458, 538 (“[U]ncritical acceptance of internal dispute resolution processes . . . will often leave
underlying patterns and conditions unchanged.”).
236. See supra text accompanying note 228.
237. If such a requirement were imposed, some employees subject to contemplated
discipline would have an incentive to provide multiple explanations and evidentiary leads as a
means of deterring the successful conclusion of the investigative process.
238. See, e.g., Giannopoulos v. Brach & Brock Confections, Inc., 109 F.3d 406, 411 (7th
Cir. 1997) (“[T]he pertinent question is not whether [the decisionmaker] was right to believe that
[the plaintiff] struck [his coworker] and that as a result [the plaintiff] should be discharged, but
whether [the decisionmaker’s] belief that this was so was genuine or whether his rationale is
merely a pretext for age discrimination.”).
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steps under the circumstances of the case to eliminate subordinate bias as a
motivating factor in the employer’s ultimate determination; this should include
a bias-conscious examination of the circumstances in question. 239
2. When an Investigation Should be Required or Expected
With respect to the second investigation subissue, courts generally
recognize that an employer has discretion in deciding whether to undertake an
independent investigation into the circumstances of an adverse action
recommended by a subordinate. In essence, employers have the option to
engage in an investigation as a means of negating the possibility that a plaintiff
will be able to establish causation with respect to the impact of subordinate
bias. 240 In that sense, an employer is not required or expected to engage in an
investigation, but acts at its peril if it chooses not to do so.
The Seventh Circuit in Brewer adopted a somewhat different approach. In
that case, a state university discharged Brewer for, among other things,
dishonestly altering a parking permit. 241 One of Brewer’s supervisors,
Thompson, relayed information concerning the incident to Hendricks, the
ultimate decisionmaker. 242 In addition to receiving Thompson’s information,
Hendricks examined the altered permit and confirmed that it had been
altered. 243 She did not, however, take any steps to ascertain whether Thompson
had withheld any additional relevant information because no one, including
Brewer, had reported such an allegation. 244 Hendricks eventually terminated
Brewer, who filed suit claiming that Thompson had withheld certain relevant
information due to racial animus. 245 The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of
Brewer’s suit, finding that Brewer had failed to alert the decisionmaker of the
need for a broader investigation. 246 The Seventh Circuit explained,

239. See supra text accompanying notes 224–227 (discussing the problem of expectancy
confirmation bias).
240. See, e.g., Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 920 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The
line of cases addressing this particular situation is univocal, and indicates that even where a biased
employee may have leveled false charges of misconduct against the plaintiff, the employer does
not face Title VII liability so long as the decision maker independently investigates the claims
before acting”); English v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1010–11 (10th Cir. 2001)
(suggesting that an employer can avoid liability by conducting an independent investigation of the
allegations against an employee).
241. Brewer, 479 F.3d at 913–14.
242. Id. at 919.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 909.
246. Id. at 919.
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Brewer never claimed that Thompson was holding anything back. No
one has suggested that Brewer was unable to bring such a claim to
Hendrick’s attention, and until he did so Hendricks had no reason to
suspect that there were additional relevant facts that she had not
investigated. . . . Hendricks therefore conducted an independent
investigation that absolved the University of liability for any deception
on Thompson’s part. 247
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit placed responsibility on the plaintiff to alert
the decisionmaker as to the need for and scope of the investigation.
The Seventh Circuit’s position deserves some sympathy because without
some triggering catalyst an employer can protect itself only by engaging in an
independent investigation into each and every instance where an adverse
employment action is premised on some input from a subordinate employee. 248
On the other hand, the Brewer court’s approach places too great of an onus on
an employee, unless accompanied by some mechanism that facilitates an
employee complaint process.
Regarding a related policy issue, both of the principal cases espousing an
intermediate standard cite policy grounds that militate in favor of encouraging
employers to engage in independent investigations. As the Seventh Circuit
stated in Brewer, “Title VII’s primary objective is ‘not to provide redress but
[to] avoid harm’ by giving employers an incentive to control their
employees.” 249 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in BCI noted that a policy of
encouraging investigations has “the salutary effect of encouraging employers to
verify information and review recommendations before taking adverse
employment actions.” 250
An affirmative stance that encourages independent investigations serves the
deterrent purpose of antidiscrimination statutes. Allowing a sufficiently fair and
independent investigation to serve as a defense to liability gives employers the
motivation and the processes with which to prevent discrimination in the

247. Id. (citations omitted).
248. See, e.g., Llampallas v. Mini–Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1250 (11th Cir. 1998)
(“We hesitate to require an employer to investigate . . . every action of its employees that could be
motivated by a discriminatory animus.”).
249. Brewer, 479 F.3d at 920 (quoting Erickson v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 469 F.3d 600, 605–
06 (7th Cir. 2006)); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998) (“[Title
VII’s] ‘primary objective,’ like that of any statute meant to influence primary conduct, is not to
provide redress but to avoid harm.” (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417
(1975))).
250. EEOC v. BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 486 (10th Cir.
2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931.
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workplace ab initio. 251 Preventing adverse actions from occurring in the first
place is a better alternative than providing a route to possible future
compensation in the event such an action comes to pass. Both the employer and
the employee suffer costs, delays, and other harms that result from litigation, no
matter the outcome of a particular case. Therefore, if the courts can provide a
means to encourage employers to prevent these harms from occurring in the
first place, it seems justifiable and appropriate to do so.
These same policy considerations apply to workplace harassment. In both
contexts, an employer faces the potential for liability because of employee
misdeeds of which the employer may or may not have been aware. The
Supreme Court responded in the sexual harassment context by establishing a
liability framework that affirmatively prefers internal deterrence and dispute
resolution over federal court litigation. 252 Thus, as noted above, the Court in
Ellerth and Faragher established a two-part affirmative defense available to
employers in cases where a supervisor engages in harassment that does not
constitute a tangible employment action. 253 Pursuant to this defense, an
employer can avoid liability if it can prove two elements:
(a) That the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and
(b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer
or to avoid harm otherwise. 254
A similar affirmative defense should be recognized in the context of
subordinate bias liability. In particular, this Article recommends the adoption of
the following two-prong defense: an employer should not be liable for acts of
subordinate bias where (1) it has taken reasonable measures to prevent and to
correct such bias, such as by the implementation of a meaningful anti-bias
policy, and (2) the plaintiff has unreasonably failed to take advantage of the
preventative or the corrective opportunities provided by the employer or

251. Tenth Circuit Clarifies Standard, supra note 223 at 1706 (“Subjecting employers to
potential liability if they do not conduct a bias-seeking investigation before discharging a member
of a protected class will encourage employers to reevaluate their procedures and voluntarily
implement solutions to effect positive changes in the workplace.”).
252. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 131, § 2.22, at 73 (stating that the Ellerth and Faragher
framework provides employers with an incentive to adopt internal grievance procedures and that
“[s]uch procedures will encourage internal complaints, thereby enhancing the employer’s ability to
take prompt corrective action”).
253. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998).
254. Id.
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otherwise to avoid harm. Alternatively, where the plaintiff has taken advantage
of such measures, or where no policy exists, an employer should be able to
avoid liability only if it has dissipated the taint of subordinate bias by
undertaking a fair and independent investigation into the circumstances
underlying the contemplated employment action.
This recommendation provides several advantages. First, the affirmative
defense would encourage employers to adopt explicit policies that prohibit bias
in the workplace and facilitate employee complaints of biased treatment.
Second, these employee complaints would provide a specific triggering
mechanism for an employer to undertake an investigation. Third, the
recommended framework would encourage employers to seek out and to deter
potential adverse employment actions motivated by subordinate bias through a
bias-conscious investigation. 255 Fourth, the proposed defenses provide a means
by which employers can protect themselves from litigation and from liability.
Finally, the recommendations facilitate resolution by an internal mechanism that
would be quicker, less costly, and less emotionally taxing than federal court
litigation.
Both employers and employees will likely criticize this proposal.
Employees could argue that this framework would bar a number of suits by
employees with otherwise meritorious claims simply because the employees in
question do not utilize a formal complaint process. These critics could cite to
experience in the harassment realm, pointing out that the vast majority of
harassment victims are reluctant to file a formal complaint and, accordingly, are
barred from legal recourse. 256
This criticism misses the mark for two reasons. First, an internal dispute
resolution system like the one proposed will serve to deter many more
inappropriate adverse employment actions than the handful of subordinate bias
cases that make it to federal court each year. Second, victims of subordinate
bias will be far more likely to utilize an internal reporting process than victims
of harassment. The most common reason that employees do not make formal
complaints of harassment is because they fear that reporting will invite

255. See supra text accompanying notes 222–223.
256. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive
Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 374 (2004) (“[T]he social science research on employees’
responses to harassment has consistently found that very few victims pursue complaints through
official grievance procedures.”); Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth
and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 208-09 (2004) (“The research
over the past twenty years, however, has consistently shown that ‘filing a formal complaint or
reporting the harassment to an authority appears to be a very uncommon occurrence.’” (quoting
Bonnie S. Dansky & Dean G. Kilpatrick, The Effects of Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL
HARASSMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT 152, 158 (William O’Donohue ed.,
1997))).
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retaliation or otherwise make the situation worse. 257 Employees who are on the
brink of discharge due to subordinate bias will not have that same fear, but
instead will see the reporting procedure as a last chance to save their jobs.
Employers, however, are likely to criticize this proposal for just that reason;
the internal reporting process will lead to an increase in the number of
complaints—many unmeritorious—and add yet another layer of internal
bureaucracy to the human resource function. Again, two responses are in order.
First, the internal process itself quickly will weed out unmeritorious claims.
Indeed, it will be quicker and cheaper to resolve these matters internally than in
federal court. Second, such a process will provide more benefits than burdens
for employers. The recommended process will pinpoint when independent
investigations are needed and provide a mechanism by which employers can
protect themselves from both litigation and liability. A few more complaints are
a small price to pay for these resulting benefits.
In sum, an employer’s independent investigation is an important third
component in assessing the appropriateness of subordinate bias liability. Such
investigations should be encouraged through the use of an affirmative defense
and internal reporting procedure similar to those adopted by the Supreme Court
for sexual harassment cases. Such investigations can serve the laudatory
purposes of deterring discriminatory actions and reducing litigation, but only to
the extent that they are fair, independent, and bias-conscious, so as to dissipate
the otherwise motivating influence of subordinate bias under the circumstances.
V.

CONCLUSION

The topic of subordinate bias liability is beset with layers of complexity.
Some of the layers flow from the multiplicity of actors in such cases.
Subordinate bias cases invariably implicate at least two actors: a biased
subordinate—usually a lower level supervisor—and a higher ranked formal
decisionmaker. But, it is not uncommon for additional actors to play roles in
these cases, such as other supervisors and managers in a vertical hierarchy, or
committee members who participate on a horizontal level. 258 The possibility of
an independent investigation offers the potential for yet another actor or team of
actors. These many participants pose a daunting challenge for a court in
determining the ultimate causal role of subordinate bias in the particular
circumstances.

257. Befort & Gorajski, supra note 186, at 633; Chamallas, supra note 256, at 375; Lawton,
supra note 256, at 257.
258. See White & Kieger, supra note 7, at 511, 530 (discussing decision making that takes
place in vertical and horizontal structures).
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Subordinate bias liability also implicates layers of important policy issues.
Concerns related to causation, agency principles, and the role of employer
investigations serve as portals to many critical policy concerns.
Finally, the appellate courts themselves have contributed to this layering
effect by providing several layers of confusion. As this Article demonstrates,
the circuit courts have adopted at least three different standards for determining
subordinate bias liability. In actuality, far more than three viewpoints currently
exist, as several gradations in approaches appear within the lenient and
intermediate standards.
A striking feature of the various liability standards is that each serves
legitimate and substantial policy interests. The lenient standard legitimately
recognizes that liability should be possible for subordinate liability that is
causally linked to an adverse employment action. The strict standard
legitimately recognizes that an employer should be vicariously liable only for
the acts of its agents who have been empowered by delegated authority. The
intermediate standard, meanwhile, legitimately recognizes the important role
that employer investigations can play in furtherance of both discrimination
deterrence and litigation avoidance goals.
Given the positive underpinnings of all three standards, our proposed
solution is not to choose one standard and one policy to the exclusion of the
others, but to attempt an appropriate balance among all three approaches. With
that goal in mind, our recommendations may be summarized as follows:
(A) An employer may be liable under federal antidiscrimination
statutes for the biased acts of a subordinate employee if
(1) the employee acting with bias is a supervisor or otherwise acts
in furtherance of authority delegated by the employer, and
(2) the biased acts are a motivating factor in a resulting adverse
employment action taken by the employer.
(B) An employer, nonetheless, may avoid liability if it establishes a
two-part affirmative defense showing that
(1) it has taken reasonable measures to prevent and to correct such
bias, such as by the implementation of a meaningful anti-bias
policy, and
(2) the plaintiff, unreasonably, has failed to take advantage of the
preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer
or otherwise to avoid harm.
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(C) Alternatively, where the plaintiff has taken advantage of such
measures, or where the employer has not established an anti-bias
policy, an employer may avoid liability if it has dissipated the taint of
subordinate bias by undertaking a fair, independent, and bias-conscious
investigation into the circumstances underlying the contemplated
employment action.
This set of recommendations provides a balanced, policy-based analytical
framework for addressing the issue of subordinate bias liability. It represents the
appropriate grasp of the cat’s paw theory.

